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Rule-making Authority
By WILLIAM HAZLITT SMITH'
From the very nature, purpose and duty of courts, rules of practice
and procedure are necessary. If each judge made his own rules for
the courts he held, varied practices and requirements would arise to
confuse and confound both litigants and lawyers. Therefore the
judges, if left to themselves, would soon get together and make
uniform rules to govern and regulate the business in their courts in all
matters of practice and procedure. Accordingly the judges, unless
prevented by statute, have authority to make rules. The legislature
is, of course, the other authority, and the controlling authority, except
as limited by the constitution, or except as it may expressly give such
authority to the judges and courts. A code of procedure is essentially
made up largely of rules, though in form and origin wholly a statute
of a legislative body.
There is now in this country an active agitation against Codes of
Procedure, and in the State of New York it is seriously proposed to
abolish both the name and substance, and scatter the contents into
various separate statutes, new and old, and into so-called Court
Rules; statutory to begin with and afterwards subject to-revision and
amendment by the judges.
Rule-making authority, almost unlimited, is granted to the judges
in England, and it may be well to examine the extent and manner
of its exercise there. A book entitled "The Rule-making Authority
in the English Supreme Court" by Samuel Rosenbaum, recently
Fellow in the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, has been
published this year.2 This volume gives a careful and complete
history of rule-making and reform in procedure in England, and I
obtain from it and from the White Book, Annual Practice for 1916,
the facts here stated .
Reform began in 1833 with an Act authorizing eight of the Common
Law judges to make rules for the reform of pleading. This Act was
broadened in i85o, 1852 and 1854. In 1850 and i858 acts were
passed authorizing the Chancery judges to make general rules cover-
ing practically the whole procedure of the court. Rules were also
authorized and made under several Acts relating to Bills of Exchange,
Dispatch of Business, Debtors, etc. Before 1875 the Common Law
Courts were by statute given jurisdiction of some equitable rights and
remedies, the Court of Chancery was given some legal powers, and
the way was paved for abolishing the distinction between these courts
'Of the Ithaca, N. Y., Bar; A.B., Cornell, 1873.
Published by the Boston Book Co.
RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY
as to jurisdiction and powers. This was accomplished by the
Judicature Act in 1875, which made the Common Law and Chancery
Courts divisions of the Supreme Court, with the forms of action alike
in each. This Act of 1875 has since been amended and extended in
various particulars, and numerous other Acts, a dozen or more, have
been passed relating to special rights, remedies and subjects. All
these Acts taken together make a statutory Code, quite complete,
and cover a wide range, quite analogous to portions of the New York
Code of Civil Procedure if it were divided into separate statutes.
The Act of 1875 expressly gave authority to the Judges to make
rules. In 1876 a Rules Committee of six judges was constituted, the
number being increased to eight in i881. Later, in 1894, the Presi-
dent of the Incorporated Law Society (London solicitors) was added
by statute, and the Chancellor was empowered to add two more
to the Committee, one of them to be a practising barrister. In gog
an Act was passed providing that the General Council of the Bar
(barristers) should choose two to sit in the Committee, the Incor-
porated Law Society should choose one, and that the Chancellor
should appoint one solicitor from a provincial Law Society. This
Act is still in force. The Rules Committee is now composed of eight
judges, two barristers and two solicitors. This Committee has
express power to make and amend all rules regulating the sittings of
the courts and of the judges thereof, the pleadings, practice and
procedure of the curts, the duties of their officers, and the costs of
proceedings therein. The Act of 1875, and all subsequent amendatory
Acts, expressly reserve to Parliament the right to annul any rule
within forty days after it is made, but without prejudice to proceed-
ings already had thereunder. Proposed rules and amendatory rules
have to be published in the London Gazette during the forty days, and
copies of the proposed rules have to be accessible to any public
body.
The Rules Committees have made numerous revisions, amend-
ments and additions so that the Rules of the Supreme Court have
grown from 456 (in 1875) to 1045 (as appears by White's Annual
Practice, i9x6).
It is not within the scope of this article to examine or comment on
the contents or substance of the Rules above referred to. It is
sufficient to say that the reforms accomplished in England by the
Acts referred to, and by the Rules, are revolutionary compared with
the old regime, and are considerably in advance of the present Code
practice and procedure in our numerous states, and especially in the
State of New York. In 1887 Lord Bowen, writing of the English
reforms, said:
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"A complete body of rules, which possesses the great merit of
elasticity, and which (subject to the veto of Parliament) is altered
from time to time by the judges to meet defects as they appear,
governs theprocedure of the Supreme Court and all its branches. In
every cause, whatever its character, every possible relief can be given
with or without pleadings, with or without a formal trial, with or
without discovery of documents and interrogatories, as the nature of
the case prescribes, upon oral evidence or affidavits, as is most
convenient. Every amendment can be made at all times and all
stages in any record, pleading or proceeding, that is requisite for the
purpose of deciding the real matter in controversy. It may be
asserted without fear of contradiction that it is not possible in the year
1887 for an honest litigant in Her Majesty's Supreme Court to be
defeated by any mere technicality, any slip, any mistaken step in his
litigation. The expenses of the law are still too heavy, and have not
diminished pari passu with other abuses. But law has ceased to be a
scientific game that may be won or lost by playing some particular
move."
It should be stated that the Rules do not apply to the County
Courts. The County Courts Act, x888, provides for those Courts
making their own rules, with the concurrence of the Rules Committee
of the Supreme Court. Such rules have been made and now number
over 12oo. A separate annual County Courts Practice is published.
It remains to consider the rule-making authority of legislatures as
exercised to date, through Codes of Procedure, especially in the State
of New York. In legislation the tendency has been to be too specific
with reference to the details of practice and procedure, and so the
New York Code has grown in number of sections and has become too
precise and allows practically no variation according to the circum-
stances. Practice under it is not elastic and is often discouraging to
a party seeking relief. The legislature has been buncoed by interested
parties into passing amendments and additions to serve some special
purpose or to fit some special circumstance. More than one section
of the Code furnishes ground for belief in the truth of this charge.
These evils are not to be charged against the Code as a fundamental
proposition. Lack of careful supervision of Code legislation in
advance of passage is largely to blame: People ignorantly like to be
told just what to do and what not to do, and the legislature accom-
modates them. Witness the agitation for years to amend the Anti-
Trust Law, a model because of its brevity and the use of general
terms.
But whatever be the rule-maling authority, whether legislature or
judges, or both, with the assistance of lawyers, the tendency will be
toward the evils mentioned. The rules will be frequently amended,
revised and added to by one authority or the other. The English
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Rules demonstrate this. Their Supreme Court Rules and their
County Court Rules and the various practice and procedure Acts
taken together equal in number the sections of our Code.
Code rules may be elastic as well as Court rules. It is all in the
making, and major operations of surgery will become necessary
occasionally in either case. We need radical changes in this State
and there are many features in the English Practice and Rules which
we would do well to adopt, but whether by Code revision or Rules,
or both, is not important. Both routes may be the best way out.
Personally, I am in favor of the general scheme of the proposed new
Rules modeled largely after the English Rules, which will eliminate
and transfer to Rules numerous sections of the Code. The plan of
the Practice Act of sixty odd sections, the repeal of the whole Code,
and transferring portions to numerous consolidated and new laws,
instead of Code revision, may be wise or unwise. There is good
ground for difference of opinion. Lawyers as a class are conservative
with reference to changes in the practice and procedure to which they
have become accustomed, but with reference to the proposed reform
they are quite generally apathetic. Very few of them, I venture to
say, have given any careful attention to the several volumes contain-
ing the proposed rules and statutory changes, sent them by the
Commission. Many have not even looked in the books.
The judges, with the assistance of several good lawyers from active
practice, may safely be trusted to formulate Rules. The same may be
said of the legislature as to Code Rules, if it has the active assistance,
advice and guidance of judges and lawyers in the work of reform.
If all the lawyers would only read Mr. Rosenbaum's book the needed
reforms in practice and procedure in this state would then have, with
few exceptions, their active interest and support.
